SETTLING MUD, RUNNING STREAMS, AND  “THE WHOLE THING ABOUT MEN AND WOMEN”:  SUBVERTING CLASSICAL DISCOURSE AND THE ROLE OF  CHARACTER IN GERTRUDE STEIN’S “MELANCTHA” by Wise, Elizabeth D. S.
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--English English 
2014 
SETTLING MUD, RUNNING STREAMS, AND “THE WHOLE THING 
ABOUT MEN AND WOMEN”: SUBVERTING CLASSICAL 
DISCOURSE AND THE ROLE OF CHARACTER IN GERTRUDE 
STEIN’S “MELANCTHA” 
Elizabeth D. S. Wise 
University of Kentucky, elizabethsandswise@yahoo.com 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Wise, Elizabeth D. S., "SETTLING MUD, RUNNING STREAMS, AND “THE WHOLE THING ABOUT MEN AND 
WOMEN”: SUBVERTING CLASSICAL DISCOURSE AND THE ROLE OF CHARACTER IN GERTRUDE STEIN’S 
“MELANCTHA”" (2014). Theses and Dissertations--English. 10. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/english_etds/10 
This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the English at UKnowledge. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--English by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more 
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) 
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing 
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be 
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all 
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements 
above. 
Elizabeth D. S. Wise, Student 
Dr. Michael Trask, Major Professor 
Dr. Andy Doolen, Director of Graduate Studies 
SETTLING MUD, RUNNING STREAMS, AND  
“THE WHOLE THING ABOUT MEN AND WOMEN”:  
SUBVERTING CLASSICAL DISCOURSE AND THE ROLE OF  
CHARACTER IN GERTRUDE STEIN’S “MELANCTHA” 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
THESIS 
____________________________________ 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the  
College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky 
 
 
 
By 
 
Elizabeth Diana Sands Wise 
 
Georgetown, Kentucky 
 
Director: Dr. Michael Trask, Associate Professor of English 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
2014 
 
Copyright © Elizabeth Diana Sands Wise 2014 
  
ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
 
 
SETTLING MUD, RUNNING STREAMS, AND 
“THE WHOLE THING ABOUT MEN AND WOMEN”:  
SUBVERTING CLASSICAL DISCOURSE AND THE ROLE OF  
CHARACTER IN GERTRUDE STEIN’S “MELANCTHA” 
 
 
The thesis begins by exploring Stein’s autobiographical connections to the 
Jamesian concepts of bottom nature and habit, in an attempt to demonstrate that both, in 
the pen of Gertrude Stein, are as connected to classical virtue theory and the development 
of character as a moral state and characters as created persons within her creative oeuvre, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
My writing is clear as mud, but mud settles and clear streams run on and 
disappear, perhaps that is the reason but really there is no reason that the 
earth is round and that no one knows the limits of the universe that is the 
whole thing about men and women that is interesting.  
Gertrude Stein, Everybody’s Autobiography 
Books about Gertrude Stein’s life and works often steal her quirkily articulated 
clear-as-mud quote for their epigraphs—at least the first sixteen words: “My writing is 
clear as mud, but mud settles and clear streams run on and disappear” (Everybody’s 
Autobiography 126). 
And certainly to many casual and critical readers alike, Stein’s writing does seem 
“clear as mud.” Richard Bridgeman characterizes it as an “unruly mélange” (xvi), 
difficult to sift through and in which to find coherence. Yet the name Gertrude Stein 
continues to be recognizable to many average readers outside academic circles, even 
today. Certainly she was a celebrity of sorts in her own day; The Autobiography of Alice 
B. Toklas introduced Americans to a celebrity culture—the artists, writers, and other 
creative types—that surrounded Stein in Paris in the early twentieth century. Stein 
lectured widely and was sought out by young American writers such as Hemingway and 
Fitzgerald—names never left out of even the most rudimentary of textbook canons. Some 
critics credit Gertrude Stein and her brother Leo with the early success of modernist 
painters such as Picasso and Matisse, also household names. And yet apart from The 
Autobiography, in which Stein writes of herself in the third person, her own written work, 
which includes fiction, essays, character sketches, plays, and poems, was not widely read 
during her lifetime, nor is it popularly read today outside of the classroom.  
Indeed, it often seems as if Stein’s celebrity-status fame and the obliqueness of 
her literary work are contradictory. Consider that Gertrude Stein shows up as the 
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character in Woody Allen’s 2011 film Midnight in Paris—a character who offers pivotal 
writing advice to Allen’s author-protagonist, advice that brings both his writing and 
romantic crises and the film itself to a resolution—yet an English graduate student once 
told me he would rather gouge out his eyes than read a page of Stein’s work. What is it 
about Gertrude Stein that has so captivated and yet so frustrated readers attempting to 
delve into her work? 
 Consider Bridgeman’s confession in his introduction to Gertrude Stein in Pieces: 
“When I originally undertook a systematic reading of Gertrude Stein, it was in the 
expectation of learning how to decipher even the most resistant of her works. That 
particularly naïve assumption has long since been dispelled. Still, the surest way to begin 
understanding this unruly mélange is to familiarize oneself with its actual features” (xvi). 
 Its “actual features.” 
During her lifetime, Stein refused to explain her work in a definitive and didactic 
manner, arguing that it stands on its own. Stein “did not understand why since the writing 
was all so clear and natural they mocked at and were enraged by her work” (Toklas 35). 
Yet even the most accessible of her fiction—certainly Three Lives is the most linear 
within each story and the most-often anthologized of her work to appear in undergraduate 
American literature textbooks—was received with some scathing reviews. Stein 
maintained that the reader who simply reads will understand. Her friend Carl Van 
Vechten, in “How to Read Gertrude Stein,” writes, “Miss Stein has no explanation to 
offer regarding her work. I have often questioned her, but I have met with no satisfaction. 
She asks you to read” (in Curnutt, 155). Everybody’s Autobiography, Stein’s 1937 
follow-up to the smashing success of The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, has been 
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considered by some publishers to be “in fact one of the most direct books Gertrude Stein 
ever wrote” (ix). Still, even this praise is tempered: “Direct, but it wouldn’t be Stein if it 
weren’t also maddeningly, delightfully oblique,” a drawback that made it 
“[p]redictably…a failure” (ix, viii). 
 Revisiting Stein’s claim that her writing is “clear as mud” sheds some light on the 
“actual features” of her work, if we look past those first oft-quoted sixteen words. “My 
writing is clear as mud, but mud settles and clear streams run on and disappear,” she 
writes, “perhaps that is the reason but really there is no reason that the earth is round and 
that no one knows the limits of the universe that is the whole thing about men and women 
that is interesting” (Everybody’s Autobiography 126-27, my emphasis). 
 By making the beginning portion of this quote stand on its own, we focus on the 
clarity of the writing—the streams that can be made to run clear once the mud settles. But 
those streams “run on and disappear,” Stein says; they leave no lasting impression.  
Still, Stein reminds us, the world is round.  
 On a round globe, Stein may be suggesting, streams—stories—don’t disappear. 
They run on and on and on, and “no one knows the limits of the universe.” This repetition 
of story is what makes story interesting, “the whole thing about men and women,” in fact, 
“that is interesting” (my emphasis). 
 It is easy to become scientific in our unpacking of Stein’s oeuvre—counting how 
often a word appears, calculating how meanings shift with repetition, tracing how 
vocalized sounds change a text’s tone, mapping out a story’s non-linearity to show 
Stein’s nuanced counter-story under the surface of an otherwise straightforward narrative. 
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Indeed, Stein criticism frequently falls into these habits, which requires a question: why 
are readers and critics alike so determined to make the mud run clear?  
Instead, what happens if we focus on “the whole thing” that is interesting about 
men and women? What if “the whole thing” is the human element of the characters 
themselves? In her nonfiction, her fiction, and her autobiographical works, Stein focuses 
on people as characters and characters as people, even offering herself as a character of 
sorts in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas. What if the characters move into the 
foreground, rather than the writing itself? What if the words—carefully chosen, indeed, 
by Stein, as she has emphasized elsewhere—are the scaffolding on which characters 
unfold? And not just character types being developed, but particular characters within her 
narratives who are themselves developing character? 
A passing reference in Everybody’s Autobiography to “character” offers an 
opening to this discussion: “In those comparatively young days… I thought everybody 
had a character and I knew it and I liked them to be in character” (4-5). Stein leaves 
vague the “when” of these “comparatively young days,” but they have certainly passed 
by the time of her lecture tour in the United States in the thirties. Her conception of 
“character” here combines both character-as-persona, similar to a character in a play, as if 
“all the world’s a stage,” with something more than a role. It is identity fashioned from 
what individual people—perhaps other “geniuses” like herself—are able to put on or step 
into and also a key part of what it means to be a human being. “I thought everybody had a 
character and I knew it” (my emphasis). 
The word “character” has roots in the ancient Greek word for the tool used to 
chisel a permanent design, a distinctive carving, an impression, perhaps like an author 
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chiseling away to shape characters with her text and chiseling out her own role as author-
creator in the process. Absorbed into Latin and French and Middle English, “character” 
evolved to incorporate the design, carving, or symbol itself that was being imposed in the 
process, and by the mid-1600s began to convey the more figurative senses of “character” 
today: features or traits characteristic of moral qualities or constitution, as well as the 
concreteness of a character as a persona within a work of literature. And when Stein uses 
“character” in this fleeting passage, the weight of this word through the centuries 
attempts to pin Stein down to meaning and clarity. Her words, in typical Stein fashion, 
resist. 
It is particularly the sliver of this slippery concept of “character” related to moral 
qualities that interests me and has the potential to lead to a fruitful discussion of Stein’s 
understanding of virtue and, I will argue, her subversion of classical definitions. As the 
mother of a precocious one year old, the wife of a virtue ethicist whose convictions 
hearken to Aristotelian conceptions of virtue, a poet, and the lover of a good book, I 
cannot help but acknowledge that questions of character development are a reality in my 
everyday life. For me, it is not an intellectual, heady pursuit but a matter of ordinary life 
lived out. Does the early fiction of Gertrude Stein and her subversion of classical virtue 
theory have something to contribute to this very-real discussion of what it means to grow 
into a virtuous human being in the world? It’s a lofty question with a down-to-earth 
answer: yes. 
Stein studies overlook the connection to classical virtue theory present in Stein’s 
early work and instead focus on her connection to psychology through William James. 
While fruitful in the past, there’s still something new to be seen through new lenses. 
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William James’s psychology, after all, was still part of the discipline of philosophy at 
Harvard in the late 1800s, and Stein herself was a philosophy major. Why has Stein 
research not mentioned her exposure to Plato’s four virtues delineated in his Republic, 
when two of those four make repeated appearances in her early fiction and her 
autobiographies? Why, when Aristotle connects virtue to character and habituation, do 
scholars skip over Nicomachean Ethics in favor of William James’s work with habits of 
attention? 
Rather than focusing in on the Jamesian concept of word “associations” or his 
habits of attention as we unpack Stein’s use of virtue language—especially specific 
cardinal virtue words like “courage” and “wisdom”—a Foucaultian approach opens up 
new understandings of Stein’s word project.  
In the Discourse on Language Foucault articulates the way a seeming cultural 
love of discourse is, in actuality, a fear. And this fear of discourse leads to the attempt “to 
master and control the great proliferation of discourse” (228), to rein it in and control it, 
to take away that which makes it dangerous. It becomes an insect: this “incessant, 
disorderly buzzing of discourse” (229). Of Foucault’s three avenues to analyzing the fear 
of discourse: “to question our will to truth; to restore to discourse its character as an 
event; to abolish the sovereignty of the signifier” (229), this latter tactic, I will argue, 
sounds uncannily like Stein’s project regarding virtue language and moral development 
of character. By taking one of the key classical understandings of virtue—in particular 
the understanding that there can be no virtue apart from virtuous action, that is, no 
character who behaves badly can have character—and subverting it through her own 
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narratives, as I will show, Stein’s word-virtue-character project can arguably place her as 
a predecessor to Foucault. 
 I’ll begin by backing up and exploring Stein’s autobiographical connections to the 
Jamesian concepts of bottom nature and habit, in an attempt to demonstrate that both, in 
the pen of Gertrude Stein, are as connected to classical virtue theory and the development 
of character as a moral state and characters as created persons within her creative oeuvre, 
as they are connected to psychological experiments in William James’ laboratory. In 
wading through what may seem to be muddy waters of Stein’s slippery definitions and 
circular sentences, I’ll show that Stein is using the discourse of classical virtue theory to 
achieve her goal—breaking down clear barriers to the virtuous life as classically 
understood and subverting the very building blocks of western thought generally. What 
else is virtue, after all, apart from the foundation of human interaction? Lastly, 
“Melanctha: Each One As She May” will become a case study through which I wrestle in 
detail with Stein’s complicated virtue and character project as she pulls virtuous action 
into a separate sphere from the virtuous person in order to explore what human nature is, 
or, as she says, “the whole thing about men and women that is interesting.” 
 
 
8 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Muddy Waters: Stein’s Historical Moment, Philosophy, and the Necessity of Subversion 
 
There is singularly nothing that makes a difference a difference in 
beginning and in the middle and in ending except that each generation has 
something different at which they are all looking.  
Gertrude Stein, “Composition as Explanation” 215 
Biographies of the life and work of Gertrude Stein range from the succinct, purse-
sized, and helpful, like Jane Palatini Bowers’s 1993 Gertrude Stein, part of the Women 
Writers Series, to the fragile and disintegrating copy of Donald Sutherland’s 1951 
biography hidden away on the library shelf. A novel approach is taken by Rachel Cohen 
in A Chance Meeting: Intertwined Lives of American Writers and Artists, 1854-1967: 
Cohen describes a brief—and fictional—interaction between James and Stein in order to 
capture the essence of their relationship, in order to suggest, as so many full-length 
biographies articulate in detail, the long-term effects of Jamesian psychology on the 
writing of Stein. Other biographies focus on Stein as a celebrity, and readers, while quite 
entertained, might begin to wonder if the purpose of the biography is to explore the work 
of Stein or describe her relationships with other famous people. Janet Hobhouse’s 
Everybody Who Was Anybody and James Mellow’s Charmed Circle, the titles themselves 
emphasizing Stein’s circle of famous friends, achieve both tasks, but these chatty and 
accessible biographies do lack a depth of critical engagement with her work. Even so, 
Hobhouse, Mellow, and others would be remiss not to mention most of the key terms 
associated with Stein: repetition, continuous present, automation, character types, and 
consciousness, all often explicitly connected with psychology and the work of William 
James. Mellow does offer, however, more information than others about Stein’s years at 
Radcliffe, and, in particular, the academic courses and other professors with whom Stein 
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would have studied in addition to William James. Still, James—the psychologist and his 
work—certainly tends to dominate Steinian critical discourse.  
Indeed, it is impossible to write about the influences on Gertrude Stein without 
addressing the role of William James, as so many have done. Rosalind Miller, for one, 
considers him “the greatest influence” on Stein’s early writing, pointing to his chapters 
on “The Stream of Consciousness” and “The Sense of Time” in the 1890 Psychology.  
Lisa Ruddick calls James “Stein’s one intellectual father, the person who contributed 
most to her first expressions of artistic power” (14). Steven Meyer, who argues for the 
influence of Stein’s scientific background—much of which was spent in James’ 
psychology laboratory—on her compositional techniques and shift from science to 
writing, dedicates a third of his monograph to the James-Stein influence. 
And the connections are not a stretch. In addition to the academic faculty-student 
connection and the scientific connection of automatism experiments done in the 
psychology laboratories during Stein’s undergraduate years, which included the 
publication of her first article with Leon Solomons, is the connection Gertrude Stein 
herself lays out in Lectures in America regarding her developing understanding of 
character types being rooted in the psychology laboratory:  
While I was at college…[t]hen as I say I became more interested in 
psychology, and one of the things I did was testing reactions of the 
average college student in a state of normal activity and in the state of 
fatigue induced by their examinations. I was supposed to be interested in 
their reactions but soon I found that I was not but instead that I was 
enormously interested in the types of their characters that is what I even 
then thought of as the bottom nature of them, and when in May 1898 I 
wrote my half of the report of these experiments I expressed these results 
as follows: 
 In these descriptions it will be readily observed that habits of 
attention are reflexes of the complete character of the individual. (137-38) 
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I’ll return to the Steinien concept of “character types” and “bottom nature” in a moment, 
but what is important here is the connection Stein makes between her increasing interest 
in psychology and her growing perceptive readings of people.  
Many scholars have spent pages discussing the connection between William 
James’s work on habit—habits of attention, in particular—and Stein’s concepts of 
“types.” After all, she uses the phrase “habits of attention” here, reportedly in her write-
up about the experiments. Without denigrating that analysis, it has become clear to me 
that much more can be gleaned from Stein’s perceptive descriptions, her concept of 
character types, than merely discussing habit and the role of William James. Still, 
according to Stein herself, Stein’s personal interest during her undergraduate years was 
William James, however factual or fictitious their interactions reported later by Stein may 
have been. 
Though the veracity of her account in Alice B. Toklas of receiving a postcard from 
William James after walking out of an exam she did “not feel a bit like” taking (79) has 
been questioned by scholars, it is not an understatement to suggest that even from the 
beginning of her academic experience, Stein adored William James. In what are now 
referred to as “the Radcliffe themes,” the essays written during her required English 
composition course (1894-95), and first reprinted as part of Rosalind Miller’s Gertrude 
Stein: Form and Intelligibility, Stein’s high esteem of James shines through: 
Is life worth living? Yes, a thousand times yes when the world still holds 
such spirits as Prof. James. He is truly a man among men; a scientist of 
force and originality embodying all that is strongest and worthiest in the 
scientific spirit…. He stands firmly, nobly for the dignity of man. His faith 
is not that of a cringing coward before an all-powerful master, but of a 
strong man willing to fight, to suffer and endure…. What can one say 
more? He is a strong sane noble personality reacting truly on all 
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experience that life has given him. He is a man take him for all in all. 
(Stein, in Miller 146) 
(As for the overly dramatic opening question, it should be noted that “Is Life Worth 
Living?” was the title of a lecture first offered by William James at Harvard in 1985 and 
printed in various forms and publications, including Talks to Teachers on Psychology 
[1899].) Stein would understatedly write later, in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, 
that “the really lasting impression of her Radcliffe life came through William James” 
(78). Also, “William James delighted her. His personality and his teaching and his way of 
amusing himself and his students all pleased her” (Toklas 78). It is no wonder that 
scholars have thus far focused on her psychological experiments in William James’s 
laboratory as a key—if not to deciphering her text, at least to expanding our 
understanding of her project.  
 It is worth pausing for a moment to note the complex moment in which Stein 
found herself studying philosophy at Harvard and how it relates to Foucault’s first of the 
three potential solutions he offers to respond to the cultural fear of discourse: the 
questioning of the will to truth (229). When Foucault describes the will to truth or the 
will to knowledge, he offers the academic world and classroom as partly responsible for 
perpetuating the culture of codification that keeps discourse in check. Foucault 
“believe[s] that this will to knowledge, thus reliant upon institutional support and 
distribution, tends to exercise a sort of pressure, a power of constraint upon other forms 
of discourse…[and] daily grows in strength, in depth and implacability” (219). Consider 
the role of William James at the turn of the twentieth century in the academy. James, 
often called the father of American psychology, made a career at the intersection of 
philosophy, psychology, and physiology. The newness of psychology as its own 
 
12 
 
discipline and the growing interest in the psychology laboratory to study the inner 
workings of the human mind and even religious and spiritual experience stands in stark 
contrast to an older, classical understanding of pedagogy, not to mention the study of 
classical virtue and human nature. James was writing a new discourse of sorts—as the 
author of perhaps the first psychology textbooks—and also reframing the discourse 
passed down from ancient Greece. How could this shaping, constraining, and scientizing 
of discourse not influence the likes of an impressionable literary-minded philosopher 
such as Gertrude Stein?  
In addition to the influence of James in the academy at the time, both George 
Santayana and Josiah Royce were significant philosophy voices at Harvard, and both had 
connections to Gertrude Stein, who in addition to her coursework and majoring in 
philosophy, served as the secretary of the Philosophy Club during her undergraduate 
years. Santayana, a poet and aesthetician, published his monograph The Sense of Beauty 
(1896) during Stein’s undergraduate years, and Royce, a professor of the history of 
philosophy, served as the chair of the philosophy department from 1894 until 1898.  
We know that Gertrude Stein took other philosophy courses in addition to those 
taught by Professor James, though certainly she did end up in seven of his classes, 
including time spent in his psychology laboratory. Even Stein’s Philosophy I course is 
often described by biographers as being taught “by” James—psychology was a new field 
and did not yet exist as a separate department—but his contribution was alongside 
lectures by Santayana and George Herbert Palmer, who was a professor of natural 
religion, moral philosophy, and civil polity. Additionally, Stein’s other philosophy 
courses included Royce’s metaphysics, comparative religion, and German philosophy. 
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(Stein’s coursework has been detailed by many biographers. Linda Wagner-Martin 
waded through all of Stein’s letters and academic paraphernalia housed at Yale and 
Harvard, and chronicled both the academic and personal family life of Gertrude Stein in 
Favored Strangers. Richard Bridgeman’s Gertrude Stein in Pieces includes an appendix 
of all Stein’s coursework while she was at Radcliffe and Miller’s Form and Intelligibility 
reprints the full text of her freshmen English composition themes; nearly all biographies 
summarize her coursework.) 
With Stein absorbing the history of knowledge in the classroom—a prime 
location, for Foucault, of discourse constraint and interpretation—majoring in 
philosophy, and studying under William James, it comes as no surprise that her later 
thinking and work reflect a question of what discourse is and how it controls what is true 
when it comes to human nature, specifically what it means for human beings to be 
virtuous or act virtuously. When Stein mentions her observation of a “bottom nature” of 
the volunteers during the experiments in the psychology laboratory of William James, 
these are the concerns she demonstrably works through. Her first publication, in fact, was 
a co-written piece with Leon Solomons on Normal Motor Automatism, which appeared 
in the Psychological Review in 1896, based on her search for truth within the laboratory 
system. Solomons and Stein explored whether writing, reading, and understanding can 
happen unconsciously or automatically. (Perhaps because of her scientific interests and 
certainly because of her difficult and unwieldy writing style, Stein would later be accused 
of automatism in her own writing, which she roundly denied [Mellow 33].) 
During these automatism experiments in the laboratory, Stein, in Hoffman’s view, 
became “mainly interested in the people involved in her experiments and not the data 
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they provided; not their reactions to what they were doing but how they seemed to her to 
manifest themselves as prototypes” (130). Certainly Stein’s claims about character types 
and the tendencies of the laboratory volunteers to say the same sorts of things could be 
narrowly interpreted as “prototypes,” especially due to Stein’s experimental writing style 
and the ways she portrays her characters with shades of character in the moral sense. But 
this interpretation of her comments about what she learned during her time in the 
laboratory strikes me as a little unfair and only begets a narrow reading of works like 
Three Lives and The Making of Americans, both in which, says Hoffman, “the characters 
function almost solely as demonstrations of a proposition made by the author about a 
personality type” (132). What Stein says about those experiments is more complex: 
[I] began to get enormously interested in hearing how everybody said the 
same thing over and over again with infinite variations but over and over 
again until finally if you listened with great intensity you could hear it rise 
and fall and tell all that that there was inside them, not so much by the 
actual words they said or the thoughts they had but the movement of their 
thoughts and words endlessly the same and endlessly different. (Lectures 
138) 
Though Stein calls this endless similarity and endless difference the “bottom nature” of 
people she describes later as she recollects her time in the laboratory, this “nature” need 
not be understood as prototypes of human nature to be used for the purposes of an 
author’s exploration of personality types. Such an understanding of the project she 
undertakes in portraying her characters specifically and human beings more generally 
limits Stein’s author role to that of prescriptive describer, rather than nuanced observer of 
humanity attempting to articulate the difficult contradictions of human action and human 
conviction, as we will see as we discuss the role of virtue and virtuous behavior. A 
reading of Stein that focuses in on Stein’s intentional dismantling of the discourse often 
underlying discussions of virtuous behavior versus virtuous individuals offers a more 
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complex view of “bottom nature.” We will find this to be the case upon closer inspection 
of Stein’s characters in “Melanctha” and Stein’s broader project to capture the “the thing 
about men and women that is interesting.”  
But the question remains: when Stein tells us that her conclusion about the 
“bottom nature” of people is that “habits of attention are reflexes of the complete 
character of the individual” (Lectures 138), what sort of “character” does she mean? 
What is “complete character”? Does she mean a moral compass that guides the individual 
toward right (or “good,” as Melanctha strives to be)? Or does she mean the way 
individuals act out a narrative like roles within a play, bestowed with certain 
predetermined or established characteristics by their nature as human beings in the 
world? The word “character” in modern English is not simply defined and has added so 
many layers of meaning since its initial use as a tool or implement for imprinting or 
embossing. According to Jennifer Ashton, “for both James and Stein, character comes 
down to habit” (305). And, as Stein tells us in Everybody’s Autobiography, “everything is 
a habit” (54, my emphasis). The first sentence of James’s chapter on habit in his 1890 
Principles of Psychology—published prior to Stein’s enrollment at Harvard—strikes the 
same chord: “When we look at living creatures from an outward point of view, one of the 
first things that strike us is that they are bundles of habits.” Animals and human beings 
alike, according to James, consist of habitual behavior on some level, some innate or 
instinctive and others learned through education and, in the case of human beings, reason.  
What James goes on to say about habit, however, is not able to capture Stein’s 
broad use of the term, especially the way she connects habit to character—and, 
tangentially, to other things in the world, like the “habit” of national revolution occurring 
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within countries like France (Everybody’s Autobiography 54). James makes habit a 
physical, scientific principle, rather than a philosophical, aesthetic, or moral concern: 
“[T]he philosophy of habit is… a chapter in physics rather than in physiology or 
psychology. That it is at bottom a physical principle is admitted by all good recent writers 
on the subject” (105). Stein’s initial work on habit may have begun in the scientific 
laboratory, but her conclusions did not remain there and instead incorporate a continual 
questioning of just what it means to be a human being—what similarities and differences 
were being repeated by the fellow students studied through the experiments? What was 
the “bottom nature” of humanity being revealed? And how did Stein’s observations in the 
laboratory fit in with the classical philosophical discourse being filtered through her other 
coursework? 
Overviews of classical philosophy at Harvard at the turn of the century would 
certainly have included at least a wave of the hand toward Aristotelian and Platonic 
thought, if not explicit and extended study. The role of virtue in Aristotelian ethics could 
reasonably have infiltrated Stein’s understanding of the bottom nature of human beings. 
To read her early work in terms of the question “What does it mean to live a virtuous 
life?” might trigger new understandings of her early work’s significance. As outlined 
above, we know that Stein’s Philosophy I course was an overview of religious 
philosophy, so why need we assume it was only under the tutelage of Professor James in 
the psychology laboratory and her work on automation with Leon Solomons that Stein’s 
understanding of character would have been shaped? Surely it is unfair to her learning 
capacity, her education, and her creative genius to assume her time studying automatism 
and unconscious habit in the lab was the sole influence on her later career’s ongoing 
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work developing character and characters, cultivating an aesthetic, and engaging in 
cultural critique. Involved in all of this work, at some level, is an ongoing interest in 
human nature generally and the role of virtue and vice more particularly. 
It is important to remember that the initial drafting of Stein’s early works, three of 
which transform Stein’s personal romantic and platonic experiences into the recycled and 
linked plots of Fernhurst, Q.E.D., and “Melanctha,” were likely composed soon after her 
formal education came to an end. And in each of them, virtue and vice broadly as well as 
specific virtues and virtuous behavior are poked and prodded by characters and by the 
narrative voice. Though our later conversation will explore this potential virtue-loaded 
reading of “Melanctha” in particular, Stein’s most explicit virtue project, we should keep 
in mind that each of these early versions of the same narrative are nudging at the same 
thing. 
In “Adele,” for example, the first part of Q.E.D., Adele tells Helen and Sophie,  
You don’t realise the important fact that virtue and vice have it in common 
that they are vulgar when not passionately given. You think that they carry 
within them a different power. Yes they do because they have different 
world-values, but as for their relation to vulgarity, it is as true of vice as of 
virtue that you can’t sell what should be passionately given without 
forcing yourself into many acts of vulgarity and the chances are that in 
endeavoring to escape the vulgarity of virtue, you will find yourselves 
engulfed in the vulgarity of vice. (207-208) 
The connections of “Melanctha” and Q.E.D. and the real-life love affairs of Stein during 
graduate school have been detailed elsewhere. Adele is Stein, we are told; Jeff Campbell 
is Stein. But, while interesting and helpful for some readings of the text, these 
connections can be limiting rather than helpful when offered as the go-to interpretation of 
Stein’s project, especially when, as a result, autobiographical exploration displaces 
thematic interpretation.  
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 Even though the three texts “Melanctha,” Q.E.D., and Fernhurst, I suggest, help 
illustrate Stein’s initial prodding of virtue, vice, and human nature, it is only fair to 
acknowledge that such themes of virtue that appear in at least Q.E.D. and “Melanctha” 
sound more like echoes than coincidences, more like a repeated exploration on the part of 
Stein into the ways the discourse of virtue plays out among interpersonal relationships, 
rather than a deliberate articulation of what virtue is or the struggle to live it out. In the 
earlier Q.E.D., however, Stein arguably explores the potential for disrupting and 
subverting what it means to have virtue, to act virtuously, and to be virtuous.  
Q.E.D. introduces “courage” in a similar manner to “Melanctha,” as we will see 
in concrete ways throughout chapters two and three. Stein’s narrator describes Helen’s 
“courage and daring”: “Her courage never fails and that is what makes her father so 
bitter,” Sophie tells Adele, who replies, “Helen has courage I don’t doubt that” (220). 
Stein, here as in “Melanctha,” makes courage and other virtue-words more complex than 
readers might first realize. To be virtuous is to exhibit the virtues, so to be courageous is 
to display courage consistently; more classical understandings of virtue could not 
acknowledge a courageous person behaving any way other than courageous. Stein has 
already begun to disrupt these understandings in her earliest drafts of fiction, separating 
definitions of virtue from lived out virtuous experience. 
I’ll explore the ambiguity of Stein’s language later, but for now consider one 
more example from Q.E.D. which muddies the waters of virtue ethics even more. 
Adele—the character most identified with Stein herself—replies to Helen’s praising of 
Adele’s honesty, “‘Oh honest,’ returned Adele lightly. ‘Honesty is a selfish virtue. Yes I 
am honest enough’” (213-14, my emphasis). What are readers to make of a “selfish 
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virtue”? Isn’t a “virtue” by definition something that is not selfish? In “Melanctha,” Rose, 
too, was described as having paradoxical “selfish wisdom.” At the very least, Stein is 
learning here in her early career—or, rather, before Stein could even be said to have had a 
career—to try to broaden the definitions established by the discourse of classical virtue. 
Stein distinguishes between innate character types and the actions of lived experience—
and these are, unparadoxically, two sides of the same coin, as the cliché goes. That “coin” 
is virtue. 
If virtue-laden readings of Stein’s written work seem far-fetched, consider Stein’s 
personal correspondence cited, among other places, in Mellow’s biography. Indeed 
morality was, at the very least, a topic of discussion among Stein’s group of educated 
women friends in Baltimore. In a letter to Stein from Emma Lootz, for instance, Lootz 
writes, “I did look disapproving when you said you had been marauding with your 
friends, but I may as well believe you when you say you were good tho [sic] I’m afraid 
our conceptions of virtue differ” (Mellow 60). Perhaps what we need to explore are these 
questions: what was Stein’s “conception” of virtue? Could a closer look at her early 
works, especially “Melanctha,” in terms of her exploration of virtue open up her later 
works for readers and critics alike? What could it mean to our appreciation of Stein’s 
project to define “character” with all of its shades of meaning: from an imprinting tool, to 
the imprint itself, to an identifying characteristic, to moral qualities, to the created 
persons within a text? What if we keep Foucault close at hand as we describe Stein’s 
separation of traditional discourse about virtue and character and habit from the academy 
in which she was taught to converse in those terms? 
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These questions, I will show, are more related than they may at first appear, and 
help to reveal new understandings of Stein’s complicated and ongoing project to capture 
and critique human nature and, also, to locate herself as genius-writer within it. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Running Clear: Word Choice, Character, and the Complexity of Stein’s Project 
 
So it was with Gertrude’s repetitive sentences, each one building up, 
phrase by phrase, the substance of her characters.  
James Mellow, Charmed Circle 71 
Jane Palatini Bowers suggests that Stein, while writing Three Lives,  
discovered that language could do other things besides name, describe, 
and report. It could, for instance, embody rhythms…. If freed from 
intention and expectation…language could also play…. In Stein’s work, 
then, the objective world becomes less and less important and the object 
that is the work of art and the process by which it is created become 
paramount. (35)  
Three Lives, in fact, was “acknowledged later as the earliest modernist, experimental 
fiction” (Bowers 6), though Stein wouldn’t necessarily have agreed. In Toklas, we find 
that Stein considered The Making of Americans to be “the beginning, really the beginning 
of modern writing” (215). Regardless, Stein’s words were doing something new, 
changing the narrative landscape and carving out what it meant to be a twentieth-century 
modernist. Whether it was Stein’s purpose to make language “play” is up for discussion 
as is the “object that is the work of art” becoming “paramount,” but Bowers is correct to 
note Stein’s ability to “free” language “from intention and expectation”—and not just the 
intention and expectation of her contemporary readers or reviewers or fellow artists and 
friends, but past generations of readers and writers and artists and philosophers, those 
who have controlled what is said about knowledge and human nature, and those who will 
continue to control it. Here again Foucault’s articulation about the way discourse has 
been controlled at a widespread cultural level helps us understand how Stein begins to 
“free” her language from this control.  
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In her lecture “What Is English Literature?” Stein traces the decisions modernist 
writers need to make back to the Elizabethan period: “There was a choice between 
serving god and mammon. This choice has nothing to do with religion, it has nothing to 
do with success. It has to do with something different than that, it has to do with 
completion…. And words had everything to do with it” (Lectures 22, 23). It is the 
deliberate act of choosing words—acknowledging the power that words have within a 
writer’s milieu and then crafting art intentionally in ways that shape this power and, 
potentially, subvert it through the written work—that marks the work as complete. And 
the evolution of words is ongoing. In classic Stein obscurity combined with chattiness, 
she says,  
This makes literature words whether you choose them whether you use 
them, whether they are there whether or not you use them and whether 
they are no longer there even when you are still going on using them. And 
in this way a century is a century. One century has words, another century 
chooses words, another century uses words and then another century using 
the words no longer has them. 
 All this as you have it inside you settles something it settles what 
you complete if you complete anything, it settles whether you address 
something as you express anything. In short it settles what you do as you 
proceed to write which you certainly do, that is which I certainly do. 
(Lectures 27) 
Stein’s confession “that is which I certainly do” reminds us that she, too, is a product of 
the generations that have gone before; former centuries’ choice of words, use of words, 
has settled inside her in such a way as to enable her to complete “anything.”  
In the way previous centuries’ words shape the work of modern writers—if those 
writers “address something,” that is—the influence acts as a subconscious shaping and 
framing of the writers’ works, partly because of subconscious associations of particular 
words. This is not to say that Stein’s writing or word choice is subconscious. On the 
contrary, Stein was constantly aware, perhaps too aware, of her project of redefining and 
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subverting discourse to convey new meaning: “I have been the creative literary mind of 
the century,” she announces matter-of-factly in Everybody’s Autobiography (22). “I am 
the most important writer writing today” (29). The “genius” of her work is in her ability 
to take the subconscious word-association cloud floating around the modern world and 
intentionally poking and prodding those word associations to subvert the status quo, at 
least in regard to human nature, habit, and character. 
Word choice is at the heart of Gertrude Stein’s writing, and central to her 
meaning-making-and-remaking project. Jonathan Levin connects the linguistic 
experiments of William James, rather than his work on the unconscious or habits of 
attention as so many other Stein scholars do, to Stein’s understanding of the role of 
words. James’s word exercises sought to empty words of meaning by “reduc[ing them] to 
a bare sensation” (Levin 151). Levin links this meaning-emptying of words to Stein’s 
writing, but notes a slight difference: 
She follows William James in recognizing that words acquire meaning 
from the mind’s stock of associations, but she refuses to allow habitual 
patterns of association to obscure the multiple associative contexts of 
words.  
Stein’s writing, especially those aspects of it which have seemed 
so enigmatic, is designed to resist the repose that would put an end to the 
continuous movement of perception and understanding. Her style 
develops, and endlessly changes over time, from the conviction that 
perception and conception are essentially dynamic processes that we 
renew and transform in every new moment of language use. The 
continuous present which she seeks to represent is the dynamic moment of 
this renewal and transformation. Stein’s words are always in transition, 
foregrounding the processes that make and remake meanings. (154) 
Whereas James focused in on the stagnation of word association, a frozen or closed 
system, Stein allowed for myriad and dynamic interpretations and reinterpretations of 
words. With her repeated use of virtue words, like “wisdom” and “courage” in 
“Melanctha” or the more benign “good” throughout Three Lives, Stein offers shades of 
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these words to her readers and to the characters themselves being described. Indeed, part 
of “meaning” being remade over and over in the text is the respect offered to Stein’s 
characters on the page that is offered to human characters in real life: the freedom to shift 
and change and not be trapped by the propensity to behave or misbehave in acceptable 
and unacceptable ways. Stein’s words that “seem so enigmatic” are what make her so 
confident—perhaps rightly—in her own creative genius, subverting the acceptable 
discourse of literature and of classical philosophy by muddying the waters. 
 Because Stein’s word choice is arguably particular, it is hard to synthesize her 
strong sense of purpose and specificity of language I’m arguing for here with her writing 
technique, at least as articulated by her friend Carl Van Vechten. Praising her “unique” 
method, Van Vechten describes it thus: “She usually writes in the morning, and she sets 
down the words as they come from her pen; they bubble, they flow; they surge through 
her brain and she sets them down. You may regard them as nonsense, but the fact remains 
that effective imitations of her style do not exist” (in Curnutt 155). Is it reasonable to 
believe that her words do just “bubble” and “flow” from her pen as she sits meditatively 
each morning? Perhaps. Or perhaps the image of the flowing pen is one Stein 
promulgated to emphasize the role of the genius writer she was reputed to be, or at least 
the image she reported to have. Her notebooks, which were transcribed by Toklas and 
eventually preserved in the Yale Libraries, illustrate a complex drafting process that 
includes, at the very least, crossed out words, playful experimentation, and notes to 
Toklas throughout (see Dydo). Regardless of whether Stein wrote as the inspired genius 
she claimed to be or not, the way that the mechanics of words, grammatical conventions, 
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sounds, and her historical milieu work together to create meaning fascinated Stein 
throughout her career. 
 In fact, Stein used the mechanics of writing as a means of explaining in her 
lectures what she saw as a shift in writing emphasis through the centuries: from the words 
of the seventeenth century, to phrases of the eighteenth century, to sentences of the 
nineteenth century, to paragraphs of the twentieth (see Lectures 42-49). She places 
herself in the twentieth century, with her powerful use of paragraphs. And yet, not 
surprisingly to her readers, it is not Stein’s paragraphs that literary critics spend their own 
paragraphs and pages upon pages explaining, defining, poking, and prodding. It is her 
words within those paragraphs. The image of muddied streams running clear as they flow 
around the globe is a helpful metaphor here, too—from words to phrases to sentences to 
paragraphs to the words that make up those paragraphs: it is all genius flowing from the 
pencil of Gertrude Stein. 
 Stein’s words—their precision as well as lack thereof—have been a stumbling 
block to readers and educated critics alike since her earliest publications. Compared to 
James Joyce, for example, another modernist, “Stein did not seem learned. Her primitive 
and childlike vocabulary provoked condescending smiles” (Dydo 13). In her pursuit of 
publication for Three Lives, Stein was treated as if she were not a native English speaker, 
despite her own conviction that her writing was indeed straightforward and precise. 
Writing of herself in the third person, Stein reports, “Later she did not understand why 
since the writing [in Three Lives] was all so clear and natural they mocked at and were 
enraged by her work” (Toklas 35). 
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When Three Lives, “the book that ushered in the modern period in American 
fiction” (Charters vii), was published in 1909, the reviews were somewhat diverse, 
ranging from the accusation that the “stories utterly lack construction and focus” (Curnutt 
11) to the more nuanced claim that “the slow, broken rhythm of the prose corresponds to 
the rhythm of the ‘lives’ and to the reader’s rhythmic comprehension” (12). One 
anonymous reviewer suggested that if Stein “should attempt the same things with minds 
of a higher caliber, the result might be more entertaining” (9). It’s not a bad suggestion, 
really, if “entertainment” were high on Stein’s list of motivations to write at the turn of 
the century. But such was not the case. One reviewer, in particular, begins to capture the 
essence of Stein’s narrative project and is worth noting for its being the exception in the 
ocean of negativity: “Not written in the vernacular, it yet gives that impression. At first 
one fancies the author using repetition as a refrain is used in poetry. But it is something 
more subtle still; something involved, something turning back, for a new beginning, for a 
lost strand in the spinning” (10). Indeed, Stein’s project is one of subtlety, a subtle 
subversion of the very words that seem elementary, childlike, repetitive. Stein’s writing 
and her characters turn and return to the basics of behavior and human nature, 
discovering and rediscovering and questioning what it can possibly mean to be virtuous, 
to act virtuously, to live in the complex world of “good” and “nice,” a world of “wisdom” 
and “courage” and, yet, “wandering.” Stein herself wanders back to the words as she 
searches for “a lost strand in the spinning.” 
Stein describes her writing of “Melanctha” in the often cited 1926 lecture, 
“Composition as Explanation”: 
I wrote a negro story called Melanctha. In that there was a constant 
recurring and beginning there was a marked direction in the direction of 
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being in the present although naturally I had been accustomed to past 
present and future, and why, because the composition forming around me 
was a prolonged present. . . . I knew nothing of a continuous present but it 
came naturally to me to make one, it was simple it was clear to me and 
nobody knew why it was done like that, I did not myself although 
naturally to me it was natural. (220) 
Stein once again falls back on her role as the genius writer in claiming that she herself did 
not even know why the story unfolded as it did in the “prolonged present” though to her 
“it was natural.” The oft-discussed “continuous present” in Stein’s collection, I want to 
suggest, supports Stein’s project as I describe it: a complex subversion of the way human 
nature and experience are captured on the page. Virtue and vice and decisions and 
immobility and contradiction in lived experience are worth exploring and it takes a 
Gertrude Stein figure—confident, even arrogant, with both literary and laboratory and 
philosophical training—to capture that complexity in every moment of a story as it 
unfolds and refolds back on itself. Perhaps this echoes the anonymous reviewer’s 
perception of “something turning back, for a new beginning.” 
 The jarring difference of Stein’s writing from that of her contemporaries might 
disguise some of the subtlety of Stein’s project, though Three Lives, in general, is one of 
the most narrative and straightforward of the texts in her oeuvre. Something subtle, 
something readers can lose in the repetition, has been established here and in the seeming 
hundreds of books published about Stein’s work over the last half century. Most 
important to Stein’s project as I hope to present it is the precision and rhythm of the 
language that turns words and phrases back on themselves to add meaning, “for a new 
beginning,” as the reviewer wrote, rather than merely point to the stark inability of the 
English language to capture the essence of human nature—though it may be arguable 
Stein attempts to do both. 
 
28 
 
What is most pertinent about Stein’s use of language, her use of precise words in 
a seemingly repetitive way, is her commitment to writing “directly.” “Any one can use 
words to say something,” Stein writes.  
And in using these words to say what he has to say he may use those 
words directly or indirectly. If he uses these words indirectly he says what 
he intends to have heard by somebody who is to hear and in so doing 
inevitably he has to serve mammon. […] Now serving god for a writer 
who is writing is writing anything directly, it makes no difference what it 
is but it must be direct, the relation between the thing done and the doer 
must be direct. In this way there is completion and the essence of the 
completed thing is completion. (Lectures 23-24) 
For Stein, “the relationship between the thing done and the doer must be direct” in order 
for writing to be complete. By “complete,” Stein suggests that the written work stems 
directly from the writer’s being authentic, rather than for the reader’s reception of the 
word.  
Bowers argues, however, that Stein’s goal in her repetition of words is the 
opposite of precision of language, that it is rather the unreliability of it: “Stein 
demonstrates this chameleon-like quality of language through the use of repetition. The 
more she repeats a word or a phrase, the more she reveals its unreliability” (50). But if 
Stein’s goal is completeness and writing directly—that is, serving god rather than 
mammon, as Stein herself says—perhaps language isn’t unreliable but especially reliable; 
what if it is the readers and the cultural milieu that are unreliable in their reception of the 
work? The writer’s goal is not reception but precision and clarity in conveying the human 
experience, in conveying character, in conveying the difficulty of expectations and life 
and the words that convey our core experiences being handed down through generations 
in a way that is unlivable and unreliable. 
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 When the writer succeeds in writing directly, however, it could be argued from 
Stein’s lecture that the reader can sense the completeness of the work through the words. 
Consider how Mariann DeKoven describes the complexity communicated by Stein in 
“Melanctha” through her repetition and particularity of language as “the beginning of 
Stein’s journey into experimental writing”: 
the ordinary, simple vocabulary, even more reduced than in the earlier 
novellas, is often used so elastically, to cover so many meanings, and at 
the same time so indeterminately, that certain words become emblematic, 
invoking large, open-ended complexes of feeling and association, as well 
as meaning, each time they appear. These complexes of feeling, 
association, and meaning remain vague, inchoate; strongly felt by the 
reader but never clearly articulated by the narrator. (44) 
Pointing to Stein’s “complexes of feeling” conveyed by her narrator’s repetitive word 
choice accurately captures Stein’s project of writing directly, but to call these complexes 
of feeling “open-ended,” and to suggest her “ordinary, simple vocabulary” is used “so 
indeterminately,” unfairly characterizes the power of Stein’s language as somehow vague 
and meandering, when in fact, I want to argue, Stein’s simple vocabulary succeeds 
because of its precision. 
 Stein’s narrators in Three Lives, and especially her narrator in “Melanctha,” are 
far from simple-minded or barely illiterate. Rather, Stein uses their particularity of 
vocabulary, as simple as it is, to point to the way the human condition is often 
inexpressible by the limited vocabulary—or perhaps historical understanding of 
particular words—that are ascribed by the current milieu. As David Buckham 
understands it, Stein’s narrative project fits on the modernist spectrum because she “is 
questioning the value of an omniscient, autotelic narrator who tells what is going on and 
who relates the meaning of what is going on”; but  
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Stein’s particular innovation, perhaps, was to have a narrator who seems 
to be omniscient, who seems to be conventional, employing verbal 
structures that would be common to a mimetic emulation of a particular 
colloquial ‘voice’, but whose language works, through overemphasis of 
these structures, through the use of repetitive structures both at the level of 
diction and syntax, to undermine any sense of thematic synthesis or clear 
referential meaning. (Buckham 68) 
Perhaps this is why some contemporary reviewers commented on Stein’s use of dialect in 
“Melanctha” and a prospective publishing house thought Stein was not a native English 
speaker. Stein’s narrator “seems” to be a lot of things on the surface—conventional, 
colloquial, and, as DeKoven claimed, open-ended and indeterminate. But these 
interpretations of the narrative voice are undermined by the word choice itself, by the 
intentional repetition that opens up the text.  
It is not, as Buckham suggests, thematic interpretation or meaning that are at 
stake, however; it is more than that. It is Stein’s project as a whole to convey character by 
breaking apart classical understandings of human nature and habit and by resisting the 
rise of scientific discourse that began to replace those classical understandings. And that 
project, I want to argue, is certainly not undermined by her simple-vocabularied, 
straightforward-yet-repetitive narrator precisely because of the specific words Stein puts 
in that narrative voice. Repetition and word choice become central to this project and its 
successful conveyance.  
 Within Stein’s narrative repetition of broad ideologically charged words—like 
“good” and “bad”—is also a focus on details, which enables Stein to tweak her emphases, 
move the story forward rather than become stagnant and muddied, and, what is most 
important, bring out the developing character of her central players of Three Lives more 
generally, and the “Melanctha” story in particular. Stein maintains that she “has always 
been possessed by the intellectual passion for exactitude in the description of inner and 
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outer reality” (Toklas 211). On the opening page of “The Good Anna,” for example, after 
announcing simply that “Anna led an arduous and troubled life” (3), the narrator 
describes the physical space of that troubled life: 
Anna managed the whole little house for Miss Mathilda. It was a funny 
little house, one of a whole row of all the same kind that made a close pile 
like a row of dominoes that a child knocks over, for they were built along 
a street which at this point came down a steep hill. They were funny little 
houses, two stories high, with red brick fronts and long white steps.  
An entire paragraph of detailed description such as this one stands out in Three Lives 
because it does rarely occur, and is perhaps the reason critics often overlook the power of 
these rare descriptions and the ways they alter our readings of Stein’s more simple and 
repetitive statements—in this case, the lead-in about Anna’s “arduous and troubled life.” 
Managing a house as precariously placed as “dominoes that a child knocks over” conveys 
a particular type of meaning, a tentative and anxious and unsecure meaning.  
As the story continues, we are encouraged to agree twice more that Anna’s life is 
indeed arduous and troubled (5, 10)—a straight repetition without altering the order of 
the words. These repetitions, I am arguing, are not to be mathematically filed away into 
categories or unpacked and repacked with the precision of science, as some more 
logically minded explainers of the text tend to do; repetition is part of Stein’s careful 
project to subvert normal, recognizable language used to characterize and pull a story 
along. 
In “Melanctha,” which is by far the most complex in terms of Stein’s repetitive 
project to emphasize the struggle of discourse to convey lived experience, Stein’s 
narrator still pauses to describe detailed moments of characterization, especially in using 
physical characteristics to convey inner traits and turmoil. Consider this early description 
in the story to set up the contrast between Melanctha and Rose: 
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Why did the subtle, intelligent, attractive, half white girl Melanctha 
Herbert love and do for and demean herself in service to this coarse, 
decent, sullen, ordinary, black childish Rose, and why was this unmoral, 
promiscuous, shiftless Rose married, and that’s not so common either, to a 
good man of the negroes, while Melanctha with her white blood and 
attraction and her desire for a right position had not yet been really 
married? (60) 
It is unlike Stein to pack adjectives together into a list as she does here, three times in a 
single sentence, but that compounding of details complicates the characterization of both 
women. Ulla Dydo comments on Stein’s “reliance on minute details, including tiny 
inflections of language, to develop the evolving continuity of the present. Stein always 
insists on the importance of small things—an infinitude of tiny details rather than a 
collective totality” (95). The importance of these details to Stein’s narrative project 
affirms the role particular words play in Stein’s early fiction.  
 It would be unfair to leave out Stein’s comments about the role of description in 
writing, especially if it seems to skew away from her background in science toward 
literature and other aesthetic pursuits. In fact, Stein attributes her process of learning 
about the importance of detailed description—“the complete description of everything”—
to her work in the scientific laboratory of William James:  
When I was working with William James I completely learned one thing, 
that science is continuously busy with the complete description of 
something, and ultimately the complete description of anything with 
ultimately the complete description of everything. If this can really be 
done the complete description of everything then what else is there to do. 
We may well say nothing, but and this is the thing that makes everything 
continue to be anything, that after all what does happen is that as relatively 
few people spend all their time describing anything and they stop and so in 
the meantime as everything goes on somebody else can always commence 
and go on. And so description is really unending. (Lectures 156) 
What Stein does with description in her work—pairing detailed description with 
repetitive word plays and the subversion of traditional word and narrative choices—
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might rightly be called “the thing that makes everything continue to be anything.” And 
that thing, for Stein, began in the laboratory, though she did not leave it there. 
As the building blocks of bigger narrative pieces to the seemingly repetitive 
puzzle that fits together into Stein’s stories, words become even more important. Even as 
early as 1951, in one of the first biographies of Gertrude Stein, Donald Sutherland notes 
the power of Stein’s narrative choice, suggesting that “Stein uses repetition and 
dislocation to make the word bear all the meaning it has” (48). Or, we might say, Stein 
enables words to bear all the meaning they don’t normally have at all: Stein loads more 
meaning into her words, sentences, and paragraphs by subverting conventional 
understandings of simple and common (and, often, value-laden) words. 
Stein, ever the explainer, describes her project as one of insistence, not repetition, 
which are not the same thing: 
And so let us think seriously of the difference between repetition and 
insistence…. [N]o matter how often you tell the same story if there is 
anything alive in the telling the emphasis is different. It has to be, anybody 
can know that. It is very like a frog hopping he cannot ever hop exactly the 
same distance or the same way of hopping at every hop. A bird’s singing 
is perhaps the nearest thing to repetition but if you listen they too vary 
their insistence. That is the human expression saying the same thing and in 
insisting and we all insist varying the emphasising. (Lectures, 168) 
Insistence suggests a variation of emphases; repetition is more of the same, an ad 
nauseum quality Stein’s stories never approach. Indeed, Stein is not just telling and 
retelling a story as she repeats particular words, or phrases, or even episodes within the 
narrative. Within one single story, like “Melanctha,” she uses repetition of words, 
phrases, and fragments of conversation combined with precise descriptions to do 
something more than just succeed in keeping something “alive in the telling.” In the 
introduction to Stein’s Lectures in America, Wendy Steiner describes Stein’s “insistence” 
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as “a sameness in difference” and “the inevitable mode of experience, the way essence 
manifests itself in time” (xx). Let’s connect this to Stein’s example of a hopping frog. 
 A frog “cannot ever hop exactly the same distance or the same way of hopping at 
every hop,” Stein tells us. A common enough image, Stein need not quote a scientific 
study about amphibious behavior. When Stein repeats words with varying emphasis, 
varying insistence, she draws out the experience of the frog moving from stone to lily 
pad. Even if the frog leaps back to the stone, his wet footprints will land in a different 
place—both literally, on the stone itself, and metaphorically, in time, as his experience at 
one moment necessarily differs from the seemingly same experience at a different 
moment. Even in a nonrational creature like a frog, each experience as similar as it may 
seem necessarily differs in time: perhaps he is more or less hungry than the last time his 
webbed feet left their print here, perhaps the weather has changed, a predator came out of 
hiding, an insect appeared. It is not a stretch to see how more complex changes within a 
text’s narrative or a character’s experience within a story change the meaning of that 
moment of the story for the character as she experiences it in that moment. Or the way a 
reader recognizes the character’s experience in that moment. 
 Let’s take this one step further. The success of Steinian repetition, though, points 
less to the the motion of the frog, never landing in the same place twice, and more to the 
frog itself. Rather than the essence of a character’s experience, rather than the frog’s 
progress around the pond, Mellow suggests that Stein’s insistence might be offering 
readers more than just the characters’ experience but rather offering the actual characters: 
“So it was with Gertrude repetitive sentences, each one building up, phrase by phrase, the 
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substance of her characters” (Mellow 71). What could the “substance” of her characters 
be? 
At the heart of Stein’s repetitive project, I want to claim, are her characters—not 
just their role as individuals within a larger story but the development of their character, 
their virtues and vices, the way they live and love in the world, and what it means to be a 
human being. These are the shades of meaning overlapping and overwhelming the 
English word “character” by the turn of the twentieth century. And character, as I’ve been 
establishing, is “the thing about men and women that is interesting.” 
Though Three Lives, as Stein’s earliest published literary manuscript, remains one 
of the most linear and straightforward of her works of fiction, Stein’s use of repetition 
early in her career set it apart from her contemporaries at its publication in 1909. 
“Melanctha: Each One as She May,” the longest of the three vignettes and the only one 
with a subtitle, was intended by Stein to be last in the manuscript. Set in an African 
American neighborhood in Baltimore, Stein uses repetition of words, sentences, ideas, 
and even key story events as a way to do something narratively.  
But what is she doing? Clearly it is complicated, and unsurprisingly, the critics 
don’t agree. Is Stein using language, especially an intentional repetition-with-difference, 
to convey a complexity of experience, similar to but more highly refined than stream-of-
consciousness? Or is Stein using language to point out the very failure of language to be 
able to convey the complexity of lived or subconscious experience? Yes and yes, 
depending on who is doing the reading. DeKoven calls Stein’s use of repetition “a 
complex, overdetermined phenomenon” in the text with the goal of mimesis: “it gives 
truer representation than standard writing of the raw process of consciousness” (41). 
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Perhaps Stein is trying to capture the constantly changing, contradictory chaos that is the 
interior mind of her nontraditional characters living in the world. Walker agrees that the 
repetitive words’ “patterning forcefully enacts the play of passions, the frustrating 
processes of thought and communication” even if “the simple words the characters use 
are shown to be slippery, unstable instruments” (38-39). David Buckham, however, 
considers Stein’s repetition to render her language and hence the narrative itself 
ambiguous (56), rather than a reflection of complicated lived experience or interior 
consciousness; and Janice Doane maintains similarly that the story of Melanctha “is 
Stein’s strongest indication of dissatisfaction with the inability of repetitive retelling to 
generate new knowledge” (77). But what if Stein is generating new knowledge, because 
in the telling of the story with insistence, it is “alive”? In the telling of the story, the frog 
doesn’t leap to the same lilypad twice, even if it is the same physical lilypad. 
Perhaps Dydo’s explanation of Stein’s insistent words offers the best explanation 
for these varying and even divergent understandings: “precisely because [Stein’s] words 
are centripetal, pointing inward, to the piece, rather than centrifugal, pointing outward, to 
the world, readers find entry into her work difficult and look for help in a world that 
offers none” (23). Within the world of Three Lives, we know from Stein’s insistence and 
characterization that emotions are messy, that people are complex, and that lived 
experience is not always—and perhaps never—fair. Characters are developing character 
through inner and outer experiences as Stein insistently transforms conventional language 
into a subversion of discourse that defines “character” and maybe even human nature 
itself in new, radical ways. Stein is sifting the dirt out of muddy streams. 
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This radical use of language and its potential to transform the discussion of virtue 
outside and within the academy is conspicuously absent from Stein scholars who often, 
when they do discuss Stein’s language, word choice, and radical writing, focus instead on 
its surface form. Because Stein’s writing is so striking for its time, who can blame them? 
Janet Hobhouse, like other early biographers, glosses Stein’s project in “Melanctha” and 
writes of “its use of dialogue, extraordinary in a work of that time for its closeness to 
actual speech. . . . Significantly it was ordinary human speech, repetitive and ungainly, 
unstructured by the demands of literary form” (71). Stein, as I have argued, was not 
capturing “actual speech,” nor was she trying to “br[ing] the language back to life” as 
Sutherland says her work “more radically than any other work of the time in English” 
does (40). Rather, Stein says, perhaps coyly or smuggishly, she just did what “naturally to 
[her] was natural” (“Composition” 220). 
What Stein did to words wasn’t “natural”—or at the very least, it wasn’t 
expected—but it was original. Similar to Sutherland’s claim that “Stein uses repetition 
and dislocation to make the word bear all the meaning it has” (48), Allegra Stewart wrote 
in 1957 that Stein “strained words and exerted pressure upon them, and renounced 
‘names’ (nouns), and dissected grammar. Whatever she concentrated her attention upon 
became isolated from all the relations in which it stood to other things” (Hoffman, 
Critical 99). The relations in which words stood to other things, even subconsciously, has 
become central to understanding Stein’s theories of composition. These relationships are 
often called “associations,” per the psychology of William James: “She follows William 
James in recognizing that words acquire meaning from the mind’s stock of associations, 
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but she refuses to allow habitual patterns of association to obscure the multiple 
associative contexts of words” (Levin 154). Meyer puts it more strongly:  
Stein objected to association . . . on two counts. First, it distracted from the 
writing by removing one’s attention from the object on the page and so 
breaking one’s concentration. Second, and still more damning, it was 
entirely habitual. One had no control over one’s associations—it was 
hardly possible to stop them—and as such they were a sign of one’s 
dependence on habit. (239-40) 
Certainly Stein is indebted to the psychology of William James, as I have already 
conveyed and every biographer makes explicitly clear. Lisa Ruddick goes so far as to 
suggest that “‘Melanctha’ carries on a private conversation with William James. . . . 
Along one of its axes, Stein’s story reads as a tribute to James’s psychological theories—
theories that despite their well-known continuities with modernist aesthetics are 
nineteenth-century in their ethics. Yet at the margins of the story, other material shows 
Stein already beginning to define herself against James” (12). Stein, I would like to 
argue, is doing more than “beginning to define herself against James,” however, though 
she certainly is, at the very least, doing so on some level. She is subverting the very 
discourse James’s academy taught, both the older classical understandings of virtue and 
aesthetics, as well as the scientific exploration of those virtues and natures and habits 
through laboratory experiments.  
 But “Gertrude Stein is hard work,” Dydo reminds us, “for she challenges our 
capacity to read and our expectations of what written words and sentences are, what they 
do and how they do it” (12, emphasis in original). It comes as no surprise to any close 
reader of her texts that the tendency of Stein scholars in recent decades focuses on her 
words themselves and the sounds of those words, the placement of those words, the 
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mechanics of her writing. Additionally, this trajectory is followed in linking her work to 
that of William James.  
Most connections between Stein and James are on the level of subconscious, the 
role of habit formation, and automation. Jonathan Levin, who as his chapter title suggests 
is interested in “Gertrude Stein and the Movement of Words,” describes some of William 
James’s word experiments, especially the way a word can be emptied of meaning when 
repeated by itself—“it is reduced to a bare sensation” (151). Linking the writing of Stein, 
especially in works like “Melanctha,” to this sort of task of emptying words of meaning 
sells Stein’s genius and the vastness of her project short, though even her friend Carl Van 
Vechten suggested in 1914 that “She has really turned language into music, really made 
its sound more important than its sense” (Curnutt 155). Certainly Van Vechten’s 
description should unsettle casual readers of the text: has Stein made “sound more 
important than sense”? 
Perhaps what is causing the confusion between the repetition of words and their 
potential loss of meaning is what Bowers calls the “slipperiness” of Stein’s words, like 
“good” or “wisdom” or “wandering” in “Melanctha” (Bowers 50-54). This slipperiness is 
related to her intentional style and the purpose of her work, as Levin describes well: “The 
continuous present which she seeks to represent is the dynamic moment of this renewal 
and transformation. Stein’s words are always in transition, foregrounding the processes 
that make and remake meanings” (154). A diversity of meaning, call it the slipperiness of 
words, call it ambiguity, is an intentional project of subversion and certainly does not 
make the words have less meaning but more. Stein, I argue, wants more than one 
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meaning to be present at the same moment; she wants conventional meanings to be 
stretched, not eliminated; broadened and subverted, not ignored. 
What’s more, according to Buckham, is that “[p]aradoxically, even when the 
narrator employs words and structures whose meaning would not ordinarily be 
interpreted as enigmatic, the meaning seems to become problematic” (65). Bowers’s 
example of “good” and other words like “really” take on new meaning when we hear of 
someone, for instance, being “really” married. In the early 1900s, marriage was not 
something conventionally understood as being on a continuum of “real”-ness (though it 
would be fascinating to know Stein’s take on the complex political and cultural moment 
in which we now find the discussion of “marriage” occurring and how if she were writing 
today she would subvert even those definitions being sought and established through 
legislation). In “Melanctha,” simple words become loaded and difficult precisely in order 
to transform their simplicity into complexity that captures the way discourse has 
traditionally been limited and defined. This is no easy task, and Stein’s success does not 
necessarily mean our interpretation comes without work. Buckham writes, “Melanctha is 
seemingly one of the most coherent and comprehensible texts of Stein’s oeuvre, but is, 
beneath the surface, a text whose meaning is extremely ambiguous. . . . [I]t is impossible 
to discern any kind of autotelic meaning in Melanctha through the conventional, 
‘comfortable’ methodology of searching for thematic synthesis in the text” (57). 
Certainly an “autotelic meaning” is difficult in any text, and Stein’s proves more difficult 
than many, but a “thematic synthesis” is precisely what I am seeking to do here in regard 
to Stein’s particular use of virtue language in “Melanctha.”  
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In the following chapter, I will explore “Melanctha” in more detail, especially the 
way in which Stein uses the story to subvert classical understandings of virtue to 
demonstrate the complexity of human character, habit, desire, and behavior.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The Whole Thing that Is Interesting: 
 
“Melanctha,” Character, and Stein’s Subversion of Classical Virtue Theory 
 
The composition we live in changes but essentially what happens does not 
change. We inside us do not change but our emphasis and the moment in 
which we live changes. That is it is never the same moment it is never the 
same emphasis at any successive moment of existing.  
Gertrude Stein, Lectures 195 
[A]t all times Miss Stein is a conscious artist; although her material may at 
first sight appear to be digressive or repetitive, she is actually presenting 
human beings in their uneventful daily lives according to a carefully 
wrought, fully developed conception.  
Rosalind Miller, Gertrude Stein: Form and Intelligibility 46 
The triangular love affair that occurred between Gertrude Stein, May Bookstaver, 
and Mabel Haynes has often been linked to the plot of “Melanctha,” and some scholars 
have found up to thirty-four parallels between the real and fictional stories (Q.E.D. 201). 
Indeed, “Melanctha” is considered by many to be at least the third time Stein has 
explored the same story line, rewriting, tweaking, and exploring the plot of a personal 
experience historians know to be factual. Nearly every biographer details the complicated 
truth behind the love triangle that appears in Q.E.D., Fernhurst, and “Melanctha,” three 
of her earliest works, and point to the overlap of conversation snippets between the three 
stories and personal correspondence of Stein, Bookstaver, and Haynes. One important 
piece of the puzzle that connects these published works as well as Stein’s personal letters 
has been overlooked by scholars: the discussion of virtue and vice.  
 Why is this significant? 
 The two primary reasons have already been established in the previous two 
chapters: first, the “bottom nature,” or character, of human beings that fascinated Stein 
from the moment she observed it in James’ laboratory, and second, Stein’s academic 
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exposure to classical theories of philosophy while a philosophy major just before the turn 
of the century at Harvard. Closely connected to the discussion of character and human 
nature and habit is the central question of classical, especially ancient, philosophy: “What 
is ‘the good’?” A second question follows from the first: “What does it mean to be a 
‘good person’?”   
 Stein’s exposure to these ideas in an academic setting that was beginning to 
grapple with the rise of psychology and physiology and scientific proofs alongside 
philosophical discussions of “the good” enabled her to explore what it means to develop 
character, habits, and virtue through lived experience and then articulate it through her 
fiction in a way that subverts both the classical understandings of fixed character and the 
scientific method of exploring what it means to be a human being, as if it were a thing to 
observe and catalog rather than experience. 
 First, we turn to the classical definitions of virtue and vice in an attempt to 
highlight the complexity—and success—of Stein’s project. 
 Though the earliest conceptions of virtue involved only the notion of excellence 
more generally, by the time of Plato and Aristotle, “virtue” was beginning to convey a 
moral dimension. For Aristotle, in particular, to speak of virtue was to speak of ethics, 
that is, moral habits. To be virtuous is, in this understanding, to have a disposition to do, 
think, and act a particular good way. 
In Plato’s Republic, one of the few works in which he posits answers and 
definitions, Plato delineates the four virtues that have become known as the cardinal 
virtues of western culture: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. They are called 
“cardinal” virtues in that they “direct” all action. According to Plato, the soul is tripartite, 
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made up of reason, the appetites, and thumos (thumos is difficult to translate, but it is 
sometimes called the “spirited” part or the will). And these parts of the soul are intimately 
linked to the virtues: the first virtue, wisdom, is what is exhibited when the rational part 
of the soul is in good working order; the second, courage, appears when the person has a 
good thumos; temperance is the condition of having the right relationship between reason 
and the appetites; and justice is had when reason controls the appetites using the thumos.  
Perhaps the most significant point about virtue for Plato that will be important in 
discussing Stein’s reinterpretation and subversion of virtue, character, and habit in 
“Melanctha” is that virtue is primarily intellectual: to know the good is to do the good. 
Aristotle, primarily in Nicomachean Ethics, further articulates a conception of 
virtue focused on character and habituation. Like Plato’s conception of knowing the good 
being synonymous with doing the good, for Aristotle it would be ridiculous to conceive 
of a virtuous person not doing the virtuous act in any given situation; the difference from 
Plato simply comes that it is not a person’s intellect but their “firm, unshakeable 
character” and “practical wisdom” from which the virtuous action stems (Nic. Eth. bk. 2, 
ch. 4 and bk. 6, ch. 13). Later in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines practical wisdom 
as knowing how to apply virtue; the wise person cannot choose not to do the wise act. 
Additionally, if a person has practical wisdom, according to Aristotle, then it is necessary 
that such a person has all of the virtues.  
A final Aristotelian description might be helpful for thinking about character 
types in “Melanctha.” For Aristotle, all people fall into one of four categories: vicious, 
incontinent, continent, or virtuous. The vicious person has no recognition what good 
actions (that is, virtuous actions) are and therefore cannot do those actions; the 
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incontinent person knows what the virtuous deed is but lacks practical wisdom and thus 
does not do the action; the continent person knows the virtuous action and generally does 
it, but doesn’t want to and doesn’t get pleasure from being virtuous; and the virtuous 
person knows the virtuous action, does it, wants to, and, what’s more, likes it. 
Taking character and classical virtue as two lenses—or a single, double-thick 
lens—through which to read and understand Stein’s insistence on words like “wisdom” 
alters significantly our interpretation of the text. Perhaps because it is so often paired with 
“wandering,” as in “wandering after wisdom,” more often than not, in discussions of 
Three Lives, Melanctha’s “wisdom” takes on a sexual, carnal, even illicit shade. Rather 
than analyzing “wisdom” within the text or from the point of view of Stein’s potential 
subversion of what it means to be a “wise” person or act “wisely,” discussions tend to be 
limited to the obvious euphemism for sexual awakening (see, for example, Bowers 38 or 
Mellow 74). To be fair, however, a few explore Stein’s more complex thematic at play in 
her use of the word. John Carlos Rowe notes, “Stein gathers together in the term 
‘wandering’ all the different affective, sexual, linguistic, and cognitive practices that 
cannot be controlled or understood by ruling-class reason” (233). And Lisa Ruddick 
points to another dimension of “wandering”—that the word is not “original” to Stein at 
all, pointing instead to Stein’s indebtedness to modern psychology and to William James 
once again. James “uses the term mind-wandering, or wandering attention, to describe 
such a receptiveness to sensation” (Ruddick 18). These readings lead to interesting and 
even fruitful interpretations of the text, but, as we will see below, exploring Stein’s 
“hazily defined wisdom” (Ruddick 32) in terms of its relation to classical understandings 
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of the four cardinal virtues has the potential to subvert those very virtues at the heart of 
western culture. 
In discussing “Melanctha” in detail for a close reading, dividing the content into 
three sections can make it more manageable: the first section focuses on Melanctha’s 
own narrative, especially her upbringing and wandering, while the second section 
foregrounds Jeff’s narrative, as Stein moves us into his thoughts, feelings, and struggles 
in relating to and fighting against Melanctha. It is worth noting that the precise moment 
readers move into the mind of Jeff Campbell is not clear to us; Jeff and Melanctha have 
long, rambling conversations while Melanctha’s ill mother lays upstairs, and at some 
point the “power” shifts. Melanctha leaves the room, and we find ourselves alone with 
Jeff. In the third and final section of the story, as Lew Welch writes, “The story 
continues, but in my opinion it becomes less interesting” (49). Stein moves back to 
Melanctha’s narrative, in time for her tragic love affair and startlingly sudden death. 
A simple “map” of “Melanctha” that can be traced along this same tripartite 
division of the narrative could easily be character-based: moving from Melanctha to Jeff 
and then back to Melanctha. Another division that maps onto the story as split into these 
three sections within the narrative could be based on virtue, moving from wisdom to 
courage and then to foolishness, commonly understood as the opposite of wisdom. But a 
more complex tripartite map of “Melanctha” should include all of these, as well as birth 
and death themes—the repetition of the birth of Rose’s child, for example, which is a 
moment of literal repetition in the text that sends a signal to readers to pay attention. If 
readers are perceptive to the virtue narrative, then the child’s birth and death emphasize 
the contrast between Melanctha’s wisdom in the first section and her lack of wisdom in 
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the third section. Indeed, the narrator tells us six times in five pages that love has made 
her “foolish” (155-59).  
Presenting a case for the presence and prevalence of virtue—at least a thematics 
of virtue—in the narrative will set the stage for an analysis of Stein’s complex project of 
weaving together modern character types, human nature, and Platonic and Aristotelian 
conceptions of virtue, which Stein powerfully subverts. 
 The first of the classical virtues that Stein offers to readers comes in the middle of 
a list of less-than-flattering personality traits: “The young Melanctha did not love her 
father and her mother, and she had a break neck courage, and a tongue that could be very 
nasty” (63). Without context, “courage” hardly seems admirable in this case. But as 
Melanctha’s childhood unfolds, courage as a virtue does emerge. Two sentences later, we 
read again, “Melanctha Herbert had always had a break neck courage” (63). Such a 
character trait comes in handy, for instance, when we learn that her “breakneck courage” 
helps her resist her father’s abuse (66).  
Stein’s innovation comes when she splits “courage” apart in the story, separating 
out some sort of innate character description from a person’s actions in particular 
moments. As Melanctha seeks experience, we read, “She knew she was not getting what 
she so badly wanted, but with all her break neck courage Melanctha here was a coward” 
(68). While maintaining the centrality of courage to Melanctha’s character description, 
Stein describes her as a “coward,” that is, one with no courage. The important word in the 
sentence is “here,” however: “Melanctha here was a coward” (my emphasis). Courage—
and virtue more generally—may be innate, as Melanctha’s is, but it can be lacking in 
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particular moments of action. Stein splits apart human nature and human action, which 
has significant implications for a more classical understanding of virtue. 
 A similar bifurcation occurs in Stein’s presentation of wisdom in this first section: 
“Melanctha with all her inborn intense wisdom was really very ignorant of evil” (66). 
Conventional definitions tell us that a wise person cannot be ignorant, especially not of 
evil. Yet on the following page, Stein writes, “In these next years Melanctha learned 
many ways that lead to wisdom. She learned the ways, and dimly in the distance she saw 
wisdom” (67). If Melanctha had “inborn intense wisdom,” how can it now be distanced 
from her, something she must learn? Stein continues to hint at the interplay of two types 
of wisdom, one a character trait and the other “world wisdom” (70). Melanctha, though 
wise, “wandered on the edge of wisdom” (70). As the plot of this first section moves 
forward, wisdom becomes something to be taught: Melanctha would soon meet Jane 
Harden, a “roughened woman,” “who had wisdom” and also “vital courage” (73). The 
potential of virtue to be taught, like a skill, comes up again in the second section of the 
text, when Jeff seeks Melanctha’s wisdom.  
Something else early on in the first part of the story also helps to complicate the 
virtue thematic: “Melanctha always loved and wanted peace and gentleness and goodness 
and all her life for herself poor Melanctha could only find new ways to be in trouble” 
(65). A version of this sentence echoes throughout “Melanctha”; Stein uses the mantra to 
suggest something about Melanctha, but what is it? A close reading focusing on virtue 
might work through this in two different ways: firstly, that the disconnect between action 
and outcome is an example of “injustice” in the story (if so, this repeat construction is 
possibly the only identifiable  appearance of (in)justice in “Melanctha”); or secondly, that 
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the disconnect between Melanctha’s intentions and her actions—if “find[ing] new ways 
to be in trouble” is read as “action” on her part—illustrates a lack of virtue. Remember 
that the virtuous person according to Aristotle not only knows what the virtuous action is 
and wants to do it, but also does it and enjoys doing it. Regardless of the interpretation we 
choose—Stein leaves it ambiguous—the complexity of the role of virtue in a single 
sentence helps to show the complexity of virtue in the story as a whole and the way Stein 
is subverting what virtue is. In her narrative, living virtuously and being virtuous become 
a dichotomy. 
 In the first section of the story, Stein depicts courage as a double-sided virtue, but 
the section then moves beyond courage to thoroughly develop a thematic of wisdom; the 
second section starts with tension between fear and courage, as Jeff remembers how 
Melanctha accused him of being afraid of “losing being good” (87). Cowardice becomes 
the central image of the section, a refrain readers cannot ignore: “he did not want to be a 
coward” (91); “Somehow he was always afraid when he was to go to her, and yet he 
made himself very certain that here he would not be a coward” (95); “He knew he was 
very right to be angry, he knew he really had not been a coward” (102). But once again, 
Stein offers us clues that there are two types of cowardice, cowardice of character and 
cowardice of action. Jeff says to Melanctha, “with you, I have never been a coward. . . I 
don’t like to be a coward to you, Melanctha” (103, my emphasis). His character remains 
solid (in a letter, Jeff writes, “I don’t change, never” [104]), yet he confesses to 
inconsistencies of action: “Perhaps I was a coward” (107).  
Additionally, Jeff and Melanctha’s most strident verbal argument in this section is 
over a virtue: the distinction between courage and bravery (117-119). While Jeff doesn’t 
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think it matters what a person’s motivation is—if a man is on the bottom of a fist-
pounding, it doesn’t matter how he got there, he says—but Melanctha disagrees: “It do 
make all the difference the kind of way anybody is made to do things game” (119). 
Intention of action matters to Melanctha, and what is significant, at this point in the 
narrative, she is characterized as wise in both of Stein’s senses of virtue—character and 
action. 
 Though Jeff’s character “do[esn’t] change, never,” he continues to seek 
Melanctha’s wisdom in this section, asking her to tell him what to do: “Can’t you help 
me to any way, to make it all straight for me, Melanctha, so I know right and real what it 
is I should be acting. You see, Melanctha, I don’t want always to be a coward with you, if 
I only could know certain what was the right way for me to be acting” (112). She answers 
strongly, “No, Jeff, dear, I certainly can’t help you” (113). This exchange will figure 
significantly in weaving Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of virtue being unteachable 
and unlearnable into the plot of “Melanctha.” 
 Eventually Jeff and Melanctha wander apart, and the third section of the story 
starts, it appears to the reader, with the re-introduction of Rose, with her “simple, selfish 
wisdom” (another complexity of virtue that seems dissonant with conventional 
definitions); but then the story backs up and mentions Jeff again briefly in order to reveal 
that “now Jeff Campbell had real wisdom in him” (154). But since the unlikable Jem 
Richards is also introduced to us as having “real wisdom” (154), Stein casts doubt on 
Jeff’s being better off than before he met Melanctha. As the chart above illustrates, the 
primary virtue described in the third and final section of “Melanctha” is actually a vice: 
Melanctha’s love has made her foolish (155-59).  
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As a narrative, “Melanctha” is front-loaded with discussions of virtue; once Stein 
establishes her modus operandi, she does not belabor the point. In the first section of the 
story, the most significant virtue themes for our discussion of Platonic and Aristotelian 
virtue is Stein’s introduction and of the dual nature of virtue—the difference between 
virtue as a character trait and virtue as action—and her conception of the potential to 
learn or teach virtue. This significant subversion of classical understanding of virtue 
questions millennia-old assumptions about the human experience and character. The 
second section of “Melanctha” further emphasizes the question of “learned” virtue as Jeff 
seeks “wisdom” from Melanctha and whether or not it is possible to learn to be wise. 
These threads will become central to our discussion of ancient virtue. 
As has, I hope, been made clear thus far, Stein’s use of virtue language in 
“Melanctha” is significant and often enough that its presence can not be ignored. But how 
is it possible to offer a reading of “Melanctha” that incorporates language from the virtue 
tradition and makes claims about the ways Stein may or may not be intentionally 
adapting classical definitions for her purposes as a modern writer? Michael Trask, in 
“Making Do with Gertrude Stein,” suggests that formalist interpretations of Stein’s work 
have left little room for more thematic interpretations, such as the one I am seeking to do 
here. Trask writes,  
critics have made it hard to accommodate the idea that Stein’s work might 
have interpretive value at the thematic level. Though able Stein critics 
have explored the connection between her work and James’s, for instance, 
they have viewed it largely in formal terms, nimbly positing how Jamesian 
habit is transformed into the arithmetic-like prose of Stein’s texts. 
[Specific themes] have thus proved hard to read in Stein; they don’t fit 
neatly into the abstractive calculus of most Stein criticism because they 
embody a sort of obdurate content, a sheer presence that doesn’t 
necessarily ‘mean’ anything. (90)  
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The question that haunts this research is whether the “sheer presence” of virtue in 
“Melanctha” necessarily “means” anything. Is it possible to use the vocabulary already in 
existence from Plato and Aristotle to explore what Stein might be doing? I am arguing 
that yes, it is possible. And not just possible, but important in highlighting the radical 
nature of Stein’s subverting work on human character. Let’s consider how. 
Regarding the struggle in the text between innate or habituated virtue and the 
possibility of “learning” to be virtuous: since virtue cannot be taught as far as the ancients 
were concerned, Stein’s determination to convey the process of gaining “wisdom” 
throughout the story—Melanctha and Jeff seek it; Jane and Melanctha teach it—could 
introduce some interesting conversations. One thing Stein succeeds in doing—possibly 
her most significant innovation on Platonic and Aristotelian virtue theory—is separating 
out the virtuous character trait from virtuous action. As a result, the already and innately 
wise Melanctha can still wander after wisdom and the already courageous Melanctha can 
be cowardly when faced with a difficult situation. This, of course, is impossible for both 
Plato (for whom to know good is to do good) and Aristotle (for whom to be virtuous is to 
act virtuously). Stein’s bifurcation of virtue into two parts—actions that may or may not 
correspond to character traits—not only subverts traditional understandings but requires 
follow-up questions that are, to some extent, unanswerable: what, then, does it mean to be 
a virtuous person? What, then, does it mean for an action to be virtuous? How can 
rightness and wrongness ever be established?  
There is a fluidity to Stein’s articulation of virtue in “Melanctha” that frees the 
potential of her characters, even as they seem stuck on a treadmill of struggle and 
confusion until their deaths. Significantly, Stein offers a subtitle to Melanctha’s story, 
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something the other two “lives” of Three Lives don’t require. “Melanctha: Each One As 
She May” would be a different story if Stein had called it “Melanctha: Each One As She 
Is.” The word “may” is empowering, allowing room for growth or decline, based on the 
actions of “each one.” By separating out virtuous action from virtuous characters, Stein 
subverts how virtue has been defined and understood since Plato and Aristotle. 
 Aristotle’s “unity of the virtues” thesis establishes the impossibility of having one 
virtue, like practical wisdom, but lacking the others. The first and third sections of Stein’s 
story, that is, the parts that focus on Melanctha’s development and then demise, are 
interesting to hold up and consider with this in mind. Melanctha is described as having a 
sense of innate wisdom but lacking in world wisdom. Ignoring our inability to reconcile 
that bifurcation with Aristotle’s conception of virtue, fast-forward to the final section of 
the story, when Melanctha falls in love with Jem, the villain who is also supposedly wise; 
her love makes her foolish, the narrator tells us over and over and over—six times to be 
exact. She is wise, seeks wisdom, teaches wisdom, and then dies a foolish woman. Is 
Melanctha virtuous? The question, for Aristotle, would itself be nonsensical. Stein 
intentionally breaks away from any sort of unity-of-the-virtues arguments in order to 
present a more complex set of characters who are themselves in the process of developing 
character. Stein’s subversion of Aristotle’s theory introduces a powerful way of 
imagining and describing human nature that serves to break apart the heady academic 
discourse of classical virtue ethics, which remains in the theoretical realm, not the lived 
one. 
Aristotle’s vicious-incontinent-continent-virtuous continuum may also offer 
insight into reading Stein’s work. Though Aristotle’s four types of people don’t directly 
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apply to “Melanctha,” thinking about these categories in terms of character types has 
potential here because, as we have seen, Stein herself thought in terms of character types; 
it was the recognition of the “bottom nature” of her experimental subjects that helped 
prompt her exploration of character, virtue, and habit as I’ve articulated it here. I am 
particularly interested in the character of Jeff during the second section of the story, 
especially at the moment he asks Melanctha to tell him what the right thing to do is 
(which is followed by her refusal). Aristotle’s vicious person, too, cannot discern what 
the virtuous action is. In fact, though it seems counter to the modern conception of right 
and wrong, in which ignorance often is thought to excuse bad behavior, Aristotle 
considers a vicious person to be the “worst” of the four types: such people are not even 
aware that they are doing wrong, which places them the furthest away from virtue. Jeff, 
though by the end reportedly has become wise, falls into this “vicious” category. Readers 
who disagree must, at the very least, confess that Jeff does lack practical wisdom, which 
puts him in the incontinent camp, only slightly “better” off than the vicious person. Since 
Jeff is most often conflated with Stein as an alter-ego of sorts, it is difficult to make sense 
of this shade of meaning. And though Jeff supposedly gains “real wisdom” (145) by the 
end of the narrative, only a few pages later readers learn that Jem, too, is described as 
having “real wisdom” (154) and Jem, we know, is not virtuous. 
I’ve tried to show that many critics have described Stein’s deliberate use of 
language, of “breaking apart” grammar, sentences, and words, as a way of tearing down 
structures of perception and laying it all bare. While such criticism has its place, this is 
not always helpful and can, potentially, be limiting to our understanding of Stein’s larger 
project of subverting the discourse of virtue and vice, of character, of human nature. 
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What I am arguing is that rather than laying language “bare,” Stein is muddying the 
waters while, at the same time, allowing them to run clear as they continue on around the 
circular globe. Mabel Dodge, a friend of Stein’s, published an essay in 1913 ardently 
supporting Stein’s project. She writes of Stein’s work as “breaking” roads: 
Many roads are being broken—what a wonderful word—‘broken’! And 
out of the shattering and petrifaction of today—up from the cleavage and 
the disintegration —we will see order emerging tomorrow. Is it so difficult 
to remember that life at birth is always painful and rarely lovely? How 
strange it is to think that the rough-hewn trail of today will become 
tomorrow the path of least resistance, over which the average will drift 
with all the ease and serenity of custom. . . . We can but praise the high 
courage of the road breakers. . . . (Hoffman, Critical 30-31) 
Though hesitant to disagree with Dodge’s endorsement—we can’t miss her use of a 
virtue-laden word “courage” to describe the work that Stein has done as a “road 
breaker”—I would characterize Stein’s work through “Melanctha” more as repainting the 
lines on the road of virtue theory, or redrawing a map to a place that is already there, the 
“place” of human experience, rather than breaking the road into pieces for it to be rebuilt 
by somebody else. Certainly Stein “breaks” in a new style, but I am not convinced that 
she is doing much more than trying to capture human experience—the virtuous and the 
vicious—as she conceives it, witnesses it, experiences it, though that in itself is a 
monumental task. It is a task requiring the subversion of what is familiar, of the discourse 
that limits and shapes the stories we tell ourselves about what it means to be virtuous, 
and, at the risk of sounding grander than need be, what it means to be human. 
Stein is exposing the complexity of lived experience, and one of the ways she is 
doing that in “Melanctha” is by conversing in the language of classical virtue theory. But 
she’s not coloring between the lines, one could say, to introduce yet another metaphor to 
an already metaphoric topic. Stein’s understandings are more complex than the classical 
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definitions allow for; a whole paper could be written, I am sure, on how her life at the 
turn of the century and her exposure to the new scientific discourse within academic 
philosophy and psychology placed in her a particular milieu to rethink these conceptions 
of virtue and identity. In these pages, I have only begun to scratch the surface, 
articulating the differences between human nature and human action that I see Stein 
delineating in “Melanctha,” and the basis I find for these arguments in Stein’s education 
at Harvard, Stein’s specificity of word choice, and Stein’s theories about character and 
habit. 
The virtuous person, for Stein, can act unvirtuously, as we have seen. Human 
beings are complex and inconsistent, as our lived experience has already taught us. The 
more interesting question to ponder, perhaps, is whether for Stein human beings can be 
anything other than inconsistent. To some extent, Stein has revealed, we are all the same: 
when it comes to human beings, “all that there [is] inside them, not so much by the actual 
words they [say] or the thoughts they [have] but the movement of their thoughts and 
words,” they are “endlessly the same and endlessly different” (Lectures 138). 
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